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Workplace Insecurity:The Case
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Peter Hough*
1 SUMMARY
The annual global death toll from accidents at work far outstrips that
accrued in acts of war or terrorism, but the phenomenon struggles to
command anything like the prominence of these traditional priorities
of international security in global politics.Whilst the ‘securitization’ of
many non-military issues, such as climate change and disease, has
come to be accepted in some sections of the academic and ‘real’
political world, this status has very rarely been granted to workplace
accidents.This seems to be because of the perception that a) accidental
deaths cannot be equated to deaths inflicted directly by enemies
(including non-human ones) and b) protecting workers is a domestic
rather than international political concern.
Protecting people against such accidents, though, is a legal and
political task which has been accepted by industrialized governments
from as far back as the late nineteenth century when ‘social security’
policies began to evolve in response to changing economic and social
conditions. Equally, incidents of workers in Less Developed Countries
being killed are no longer unfortunate problems unconnected with the
relatively safe lives of people in the global North since developed
world consumers are functionally connected to these systemic failures
as never before. This paper therefore presents the case for the
international community to adopt a human security approach which
allows for worker safety to be given the international political priority
it deserves.
2 SECURITY AND SECURITIZATION IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The process commonly referred to as globalization has led to
internal political issues becoming increasingly externalized
and external political issues becoming increasingly
internalized. Traditionally domestic policy concerns, such as
health and rights, are more prominent than ever on the global
political agenda and events occurring in other states, such as
disasters or massacres, are more often than ever deemed to be
of political significance for people not personally affected. In
light of these changes, and the reduced prevalence of inter-
state war, it has become a matter of contention amongst
theorists of international relations whether security studies
should maintain the traditional emphasis on military threats to
the security of states or widen the focus.Traditionalists agree
with realist Walt that; ‘security studies may be defined as the
study of the threat, use and control of military force’.1
Alternative perspectives, though, have argued increasingly that
the discipline should either: i) extend its reach to include
non-military threats to states (wideners) or, ii) go further and
bring within its remit the security of individual people, not
just states, in relation to a range of threats, both military and
non-military (deepeners).
Wideners and deepeners of security contend that wars,
international or internal, are not the only threats that face
states, people and the world as a whole. Indeed, they never
have been. Throughout history people have been killed by
various means other than soldiers and weapons and states have
been weakened or destroyed by causes other than military
conflict. Hence, with the overwhelming military shadow of
the cold war lifted many ‘wideners’ emerged in security
studies literature in the 1990s. A seminal article by academic
and State Department adviser Jessica Matthews in 1989, for
example, proved influential on the later US Clinton-Gore
administration by highlighting the need for states to give
proper concern to the newly-apparent threats posed by
environmental problems, such as ozone depletion and global
warming.2 Although viewed as unwelcome by traditionalists,
such asWalt, this widening of security did not undermine the
realist logic of conventional security studies. The focus was
still on the state system and seeing relationships between states
as governed by power. Widening was simply a case of
extending the range of factors which affect state power
beyond the confines of military and trade affairs.
3 THE DEEPENING OF SECURITY
Going beyond widening in extending the domain of security
studies is the ‘deepening’ approach led by pluralists (liberals),
critical theorists and social constructivists in international
relations. Deepeners embrace the concept of ‘human security’
and argue that the chief referent object of security should not be
the state but the individual people of which these
institutions/groups are comprised. The pluralist Falk, for
example, considers that security ought to be defined as ‘the
negation of insecurity as it is specifically experienced by
individuals and groups in concrete situations’.3 This is a
significant leap from widening which, as Falk describes ‘still
conceives of security largely from the heights of elite
assessment, at best allowing the select advisor to deliver a
more enlightened message to the ear of the prince’.4 The
United Nations Development Programme became the best
known advocate for adopting a human security approach in
incorporating the concept in annual reports from the early
1990s.
‘The concept of security must change – from an exclusive
stress on national security to a much greater stress on
people’s security, from security through armaments to
security through human development, from territorial to
food, employment and environmental security’.5
Governments which have declared that their foreign policies
are influenced by human security include those of Canada,
Norway and Japan.
For ‘deepeners’ the root of the problem with the
traditional approaches to security politics is whatWyn-Jones, a
critical theorist, describes as the ‘fetishization of the state’.6
This tendency in international relations is not resolved by
widened approaches which, whilst accepting the idea that
* Peter Hough is a Principal Lecturer in International Politics with the
department of Law at Middlesex University. P.hough@mdx.ac.uk.
1 S.Walt, The Renaissance of Security Studies, International Studies Quarterly
35(2) 1991, 212.
2 J.Mathews ‘Redefining Security’, Foreign Affairs 68 (2) 1989, 162-177.
3 R.Falk On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics, Polity,
Cambridge,1995, 147.
4 Falk op cit 146.
5 UNDP,Human Development Report 1993.
6 R. Wyn-Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, Lynne Rienner,
Boulder, USA., 1999.
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non-military issues can be securitized still tends to emphasize
threats from the perspective of states and maintains the logic
that only the state can be the securitizing actor (i.e. decide
whether the issue is acted upon as a matter of urgency).
Hence state centrism is maintained, if in a subtler form.The
practical limitation with this is that not only are the
traditional security agents of the state (i.e. the army, externally
and the police, internally) often inadequate for dealing with
security problems affecting the people of that state, they are
often a chief cause of those problems.
Whilst the practical concern of traditionalists, likeWalt, that
widening the focus of security studies should not distract
attention from military threats can be argued to have some
validity, given the post-cold war rise of certain military threats
such as terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
the intellectual rationale for maintaining a narrower focus is
weak. In a book taking a wider approach to security, Wirtz
contends that; ‘if the threat of force, the use of force or even
the logistical or technical assistance that can be supplied by
military units does little to respond to a given problem, it
probably is best not to treat the specific issue as a security
threat’.7 He also scoffs at the idea that global warming should
be construed as a security issue stating ‘It is not exactly clear
. . .. how military forces can help reduce the build-up of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere’.8 This view gives an
indication of how blinkered the mainstream study of security
can be. Defining an issue as one of security on the basis of
whether or not it involves military forces strips the term of
any real meaning. Security is a human condition.To define it
purely in terms of state bodies whose aim it is to help secure
their state and people in a certain dimension, rather than the
people whose security is at stake, is both odd and nonsensical.
This way of framing what is and what is not a security issue is
akin to saying that children being taught to read by their
parents are not being educated, or that happiness does not
exist unless it is induced by the performances of state-
sponsored clowns. A security issue, surely, is an issue which
threatens (or appears to threaten) one’s security. Defining a
security issue in behavioural terms rather than excluding
certain categories of threats, because they do not fit
conventional notions of what defines the subject area, gives
the term some objective meaning. If people, be they
government ministers or private individuals, perceive an issue
as threatening their lives in some way and respond politically
to this, then that issue should be deemed to be a security issue.
It should be noted, though, that human security itself is a
contested concept with more and less expansive versions
having come to be employed in both academic and political
discourse. Wider human security is often characterized as
combining ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’ (from
the UNDP description of the concept) in that it considers
any issues with direct or indirect life-threatening
consequences for individuals to be matters of security.
Concerns among some advocates of an individual-focused
approach to security that ‘existing definitions of human
security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague’9 led
them to favour a more restricted version based purely on
‘freedom from fear’. This narrow version of human security
concentrates on direct and deliberate violent threats,
excluding, less directly, human-caused insecurity, such as
diseases and disasters. The Canadian Government has
generally been supportive of such an approach in its advocacy
of human security as a pragmatic determinant of when
specific, concrete foreign policy actions – such as taking part
in a humanitarian intervention or developing international
human rights conventions – should be undertaken. In
contrast, the Japanese Government’s endorsement of human
security has tended to be more in line with the expansive
version favoured by the UNDP.There is a certain fatalism in
assuming that only direct and deliberate threats to life can be
deemed worthy of security status. Such a restriction might
make the concept easier to deal with but does so by simply
choosing to ignore the insecurities of most of the world’s
people even when the means of securing them are apparent.
Hence, by adopting the wide human security framework,
the notion of security is recast as a social construct stripping
away the need for analysts to speculate on what they think is
the most threatening of the myriad issues on the
contemporary international political agenda, and concentrate
instead on analysing how and why certain issues actually are
perceived as being vital and responded to in an extraordinary
way by decision-makers. The preoccupation of security
studies with the state is very much a relic of the cold war. In
some ways this is understandable since the discipline of
international relations, and its sub-discipline security studies,
only emerged in the 1930s and was thus very much forged in
an era of unprecedented military threats. Realism was in the
ascendancy at the close of the Second World War since the
application of force had proved its worth in curbing
aggression and restoring order in Europe and Asia. Pre-World
WarTwo international cooperation, in the form of the League
of Nations, and ‘softly-softly’ appeasement diplomacy vis-à-vis
aggressors comprehensively failed to keep the peace. In
addition, the total Second World War and the ‘total phoney
war’ of the cold war, whereby whole populations were
threatened by state quarrels in ways not seen before, bound
individuals to the fates of their governments as never before.
The scale of the threat posed by nuclear war in the second
half of the twentieth century served to weld the security of
individual people in the US and elsewhere to that of their
governments. The state would assume the responsibility for
protecting its citizens and demand their loyalty in return in a
strengthened version of the ‘social contract’ relationship
articulated by political philosophers such as Hobbes and
Locke from the seventeenth century. Hobbes’ advocacy of the
need for the Leviathan (meaning a strong state) to save
individuals from the dangerous anarchy that would otherwise
result from the pursuit of their own selfish interests, was a
major influence on the realists. In the late twentieth century
the anarchy was the international state system and the dangers
came, to a greater extent than ever before, from other states.
McSweeney observes that security over time had come to be
defined in International Relations solely as an adjective rather
than a noun or, as ‘a commodity rather than a relationship’.10
The human part of a human condition had been lost and the
term become synonymous with realpolitik, the interest of the
state. Military might and the application of the ‘national
7 J.Wirtz, ‘A New Agenda for Security and Strategy?’, in Baylis,Wirtz,
Cohen & Gray Strategy in the Contemporary World. An Introduction to
Strategic Studies, 2002,Oxford: Oxford University Press: 309-327: 312.
8 Wirtz op cit: 311.
9 R. Paris, Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, International Security
26(2) 2001: 88.
10 B. McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International
Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 15.
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interest’ can secure lives but it can also, of course, imperil
them. Additionally, human lives can be imperilled by a range
of issues other than military ones. A thorough application of
security in the study of global politics must, surely, recognize
this or else admit that it is a more limited field of enquiry,
‘war studies’ or ‘strategic studies’, for example. The
conceptualization of International Relations, like the conduct
of international relations, was very much frozen in time
between 1945 and 1990.
The meaning of ‘security’ is not just an arcane matter of
academic semantics. The term carries significant weight in
‘real world’ political affairs since threats to the security of
states have to be a priority for governments and threats to the
lives of people are increasingly accepted as more important
than other matters of contention. It is clear that designating
an issue as a matter of security is not just a theoretical
question but carries ‘real world’ significance. The traditional,
realist way of framing security presupposes that military issues
(and certain economic issues for neo-realists) are security
issues and as such must be prioritized by governments above
other ‘low politics’ issues, such as worker safety, important
though these may be. For human security advocates this is
demonstrably outdated and out of step with people’s real
insecurities. Deaths in accidents and disasters far outstrip
political and criminal killings combined (see Table 1). Taken
in isolation, the 321,000 deaths at work in 2008 represent
nearly twice the fatalities in war, terrorism and all other forms
of political violence. Why, then, are the insecurities of these
victims not considered to be matters of international
relations?11
Table 1 Global Causes of Death in 2008
Disease/ill-health 52.25 million
Disasters/accidents 3.63 million
Suicide 0.78 million
Criminal violence 0.54 million
War/political violence 0.18 million
(WHO 2011)
4 WORKPLACE ACCIDENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLITICS
Despite the death toll attributable to man-made accidents, in
their various forms, these are least frequently thought of, and
hence acted upon, as matters of security. Natural disasters,
crime, disease and environmental change have increasingly
come to ‘enjoy’ being dealt with as matters of security, but this
has rarely been the case for accidents, including those at work.
The absence of explicitly threatening causal factors, be they
non-human or human with ‘malice aforethought’, has led to
accidents being, to a certain extent, accepted as ‘one of those
things’ and protection from them not becoming securitized
in the same way as other causes of harm. Most accidents,
though, are wholly unnatural and rooted in contemporary
human societal practices that are becoming more widespread
throughout the world. As such ‘technological’ and more
‘traditional’ accidents, such as falling off ladders, are actually
no more unavoidable than other social systemic problems,
such as war and crime. In particular, accidents have underlying
socio-economic causes inextricably linked to the global
politico-economic system.
Most clearly associated with modern living is
industrialization, which is itself associated with far more
hazardous forms of employment and production than pre-
industrial economic activity. Table 2 illustrates that, like
structural disasters, major industrial disasters can be prevented.
Most of the disasters listed occurred in countries in the early
stages of industrialization and economic development before
their legal and political systems ‘matured’ to incorporate
health and safety.
Table 2 TheWorld’sWorst Industrial Disasters
place date type no. killed
1 Bhopal,
India
1984 Chemical leak 2,500
2 Hineiko,
China
1942 Mining disaster
(explosion)
1,549
3 Courriereres,
France
1906 Mining disaster
(explosion)
1,099
4 Jesse,
Nigeria
1998 Oil pipeline fire 1,082
5 Chelyabinsk,
USSR
1989 Gas pipeline
explosion
607
6 Oppau,
Germany
1921 Chemical plant
explosion
600
7 Texas, USA 1947 Ship carrying
fertilizer
exploded in port
561
8 Cubatao,
Brazil
1984 Petroleum plant
fire
508
9 Lagunillas,
Venezuela
1939 Oil refinery fire 500
10 Mexico City 1984 Petroleum gas
plant explosion
452
Sources: CRED (2011).12
Note: excludes disasters instigated by natural phenomena,
military strikes, or military accidents.
The world’s worst ever industrial accident occurred at
Bhopal, India on 3 December 1984. During the production
of the pesticide Carbaryl the plant, run by the US-based
multi-national corporation Union Carbide, accidentally
released forty tonnes of the highly-toxic chemical methyl-
isocyanate (MIC) used in the production process. At least
2,500 people living near the plant were killed and around
180,000 other people have since suffered from a range of
long-term health effects and birth defects. As an intermediate
chemical, MIC did not feature on the world’s foremost safety
inventory of the time, UNEP’s International Register of
Potentially Toxic Chemicals, and Indian authorities were
11 WHO, Global Burden of Disease 2008, World Health Organization,
Geneva 2011.
12 CRED International Disaster Database, Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters: Brussels 2011. http://www.emdat.be/
(accessed 20 September 2011).
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unaware that it was being stored. Investigations also proved
that safety standards at the plant were weak and that previous
fatal accidents had occurred.
According to Dudley, at a 1986 ‘Chemistry After Bhopal’
conference organized by the chemical industry, a spokesman
likened the disaster to the sinking of the Titanic 13 In the
same way that the world’s most infamous transport disaster
prompted an evaluation of safety standards but not the
abolition of passenger sea travel, industrial chemical
production should not be restricted on the back of one major
disaster, it was claimed.Whether Bhopal was a freakish one-
off, however, is disputed. The disaster prompted a rise in
pressure group activity and academic research into chemical
safety in the developing world which suggested that a reversal
of the Titanic analogy was more appropriate. Bhopal, rather,
represented the tip of the iceberg with many less visible
disasters lying submerged from public and political view.
Twenty years on from Bhopal, the International Labour
Organization (ILO) suggested that the Indian Government
had reported 231 work-related fatal accidents when the true
figure was nearer 40,000.14
Whereas disasters in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) can
escape public glare and political response, far less deadly
accidents can produce significant responses when they occur
in the developed world.The 1976 leak at a chemical plant in
the Milan suburb of Seveso was a watershed for European
chemical safety legislation and its impact continues to
resonate despite claiming only one immediate casualty. A
cloud of Trichlorophenol (TCP) and dioxin TCDD formed
around the plant as a result of the leak, although no
acknowledgement of this was made to nearby villages for four
days. Within three weeks animals and crops had died, thirty
people were hospitalized and one person had died whilst,
long term, a significant increase in birth defects was
recorded.15 The disaster had profound political effects. The
plant was owned by a Swiss company, prompting fears that
they had exploited laxer safety standards in Italy. A so-called
‘Seveso Directive’ was drafted by the European Community
(82/501/EEC) tightening safety standards and making it
obligatory to notify a local population of any such accident.A
similar shock to the European system occurred in 2010 when
a spill of caustic waste at an alumina plant at Ajka, Hungary
led to toxic chemicals burning nine people to death and
turning a stretch of the Danube across several countries red,
making graphically apparent the physical and political
interconnectedness of the EU.
The two most significant nuclear accidents of the twentieth
century occurred in the two superpowers of that age, whose
unprecedented international political influences were built on
that very power source. In 1979, at the Three Mile Island
nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, a technical malfunction
caused the release of radioactive gas from one of the reactors.
There were no confirmed casualties from this accident but it
attracted huge publicity, which was seized upon by anti-
nuclear protestors and no new nuclear power plants have been
built in the USA since. The 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the
former USSR was the worst ever nuclear power plant disaster
and, in line with the added ‘fear factor’ associated with this
form of energy production, stands as the most notorious
industrial disaster to date. Lax safety standards are generally
held as the key reason for the explosion and fire which
destroyed one of the plant’s four power reactors and released
huge amounts of solid and gaseous radioactive material into
the surrounding area. Thirty-two plant and emergency staff
were killed in the immediate aftermath of the explosion and
in the proceeding weeks some of this material was deposited
over a large swathe of Northern Europe prompting an
unknown number of long-term deaths. In 2011 nuclear safety
was again put in the spotlight with the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power station disaster, prompted by the devastating
tsunami that struck Japan. Three workers were killed and
thousands of residents moved out of the region and, whilst
levels of public radiation exposure were officially reported as
not being dangerous, many fear that significant longer-term
health defects will come to emerge.
As with transport disasters and most human security
threats, however, large scale and/or high-profile disasters
represent only a small, highly visible, fraction of the full
picture. The vast majority of accidents in the workplace are
individual or small scale. The International Labour
Organization (ILO) has estimated that around a third of a
million people a year in the world are killed in occupational
accidents (including traffic accidents whilst working). If deaths
when commuting to or from work and by illness caused at
work are included the figure rises to over 1.2 million.16
5 THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE OF
INDUSTRIALIZATION? THE RISE OF
ACCIDENTAL THREATS
Deaths by accident are very much a feature of the modern
world. There have, of course, always been accidental deaths,
but this form of threat to human life is closely associated with
technological development and has risen in accord with
industrialization and the onset of modernity. In fact it is
possible to argue that accidents, in terms of their perception as
such, did not exist for most of human history. The pre-
industrial advance of science was significant in providing a
means for comprehending unfortunate acts as something that
could be explained and hence avoided. Green argues that
‘Before 1650, an accident was merely a happening or an
event, and there appears to have been no space in European
discourse for the concept of an event that was neither
motivated nor predictable’.17 People are killed today in a
variety of non-technological accidents, such as by drowning,
but most accidental deaths are an unfortunate by-product of
technological development. Health and safety legislation in
developed countries has succeeded in reducing the potential
hazards associated with transport, industrial production and
the use of public buildings but, at the same time, people
continue to travel more than ever and the industrial
production and transportation of potentially hazardous
substances continues to increase.
13 N. Dudley, This Poisoned Earth. The Truth About Pesticides, Platkus,
London 1987: x.
14 ILO World Day for Safety and Health at Work: A Background Paper,
International Labour Organization, Geneva, 2005.
15 F. Pocchiari, V. Silaro, & G. Zapponi, The Seveso Accident and its
Aftermath, Springer-Verlag; Berlin, Heidelberg & NewYork,1987.
16 ILO Introductory Report: Global Trends and Challenges on Occupational
Safety and Health at Work, XIX World Congress on Safety and Health at
Work, Istanbul 11-15 September 2011: 155, 1872011.
17 J. Green, Risk and Misfortune. The Social Construction of Accidents, UCL
Press, London, 1997, 196.
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Smith posits that 1984 was a watershed year for
technological disasters.18 Table 2 confirms this. As well as the
Bhopal disaster, that year also saw a petroleum fire in
Cubatao, Brazil kill 508 people and a petroleum gas explosion
in Mexico City claim 540 lives. In total, more people were
killed in major incidents that year than in all technological
disasters of the previous forty years. In particular, the three
prominent disasters were in LDCs avidly pursuing industrial
development. This served to demonstrate that there was a
socio-economic dimension to industrial accidents. The vast
majority of such deaths prior to 1984 had been attributable to
small-scale accidents in the developed world, giving credence
to the notion that these were an unfortunate but inevitable
form of collateral damage offset by the overall social gains to
be had from sustained economic growth and mass
consumerism. The scale of the problem in industrializing
LDCs or ‘emerging markets’ now far outstrips that in the
global North. Between 1998 and 2001, in contrast to stable or
falling figures in the developed world, work fatalities in China
rose from 73,500 to 90,500 and in Latin America from
29,500 to 39,500.19
The 1984 disasters also illustrated that technological
accidents had become an international political economy
issue in another dimension. It became clear on investigation
that safety standards at Union Carbide’s Bhopal plant were far
more lax than at their home plant in West Virginia. The
disaster gave ammunition to pressure groups and
commentators concerned that globalization was a ‘race to the
bottom’ in which MNCs would escape domestic safety
constraints and seek out low-wage, low-safety sites for their
operations.
An added transboundary and global dimension to
workplace accidents comes from the disproportionate number
of victims amongst migrant labourers. For example, whilst
confirmed figures are not available, reports have suggested a
shocking death toll in the United Arab Emirates, a country
with the highest proportion of migrant workers in the world.
It has been suggested that, over recent years, two construction
workers per week die in Abu Dhabi and that 880 Indians and
Pakistani’s working on Dubai’s rapidly emerging skyline were
killed on the job in 2004.20 Even in the country with what
are regularly suggested to be the world’s highest living
standards and one of the most liberal immigration policies,
Norway, migrant workers are nearly three times as likely to
suffer an accident at work than the working population as a
whole.21
6 INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON ACIDENTS
In the 1996 volume The Long Road to Recovery: Community
Responses to Industrial Disaster, which was the culmination of a
four-year United Nations University project investigating a
number of disasters, James Mitchell argued that ‘it is difficult
to argue that there has been much progress in converting
these surprises into routing hazards’.22 Amongst the chief
policy recommendations of the book there is one for an
international clearing house of industrial hazard information
to be established to improve the learning process.23 This is a
particularly dismal conclusion since such a proposal has been
on the global political agenda since the 1920s when debated
by the International Labour Organization (ILO).
6.1 The ILO and Industrial Accidents
The ILO was founded in 1919 as part of the League of
Nations system, absorbing the work of the International
Association for Labour Legislation which had been set up in
1901. The ILO’s 1929 Prevention of Industrial Accidents
Recommendation (R31) incorporated a resolution of the
previous year’s International Labour Conference (ILC) that
information be collated systematically on accidents and their
causes. Numerous ILO Conventions dealing with worker
safety have been drafted and signed in the proceeding
decades, culminating in the 1993 Prevention of Major
Industrial Accidents Convention (C174). Amongst the key
requirements placed on ratifying states of this Convention are:
a) Article 4: the formulation, through consultation with
stakeholders, of state safety policies.
b) Article 16: the dissemination of information on safety
measures on how to deal with an accident and prompt
warning in the event of an accident.
c) Article 17: siting hazardous installations away from
residential areas.
d) Article 22: ensuring the prior informed consent of
importing authorities before exporting substances or
technologies to other states prohibited for safety reasons in
your own state.
These provisions are in accord with received wisdom on
industrial safety and the domestic legislation of most
industrialized countries but many are ambiguous and the
Convention, as a whole, is surprisingly short for a legal
document on such a broad, technical issue. A further
limitation comes from the fact that it is also written into the
agreement that the provisions do not apply to the nuclear
industry, to military installations or to off-site transportation
(except pipelines). Despite all of this, nineteen years after the
Convention had been signed, only sixteen countries had
ratified it (it entered into force in 1997 after the second
ratification).24 This is, in part, due to the snail’s pace of
international legislation but it can also be seen that most
governments do not take much interest in international safety
policy.The ratification rate for older ILO safety conventions is
little better. The 1985 Occupational Health Services
Convention (C161), which requires that a state’s occupational
health services advise employers and workers on safety, by
2012 had been ratified by only thirty of the ILO’s 185
Member States. This is particularly telling since, whilst many
developed states can cite the fact that they have more
thorough domestic legislation as a basis for not ratifying the
18 K. Smith, Environmental Hazards. Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster,
Routledge, London & NewYork, 2001: 322.
19 ILO/WHO World Day for Safety and Health atWork A Background Paper.
Geneva: International Labour Organization.2005
20 Sonmez, Apostopoulos, Tran & Dentrope, Human Rights and Health
Disparities for MigrantWorkers, in Health & Human Rights 13(2) 2011.
21 B. Langeland, Work Related Accidents and Risks Among Migrant Workers,
European Working Conditions Observatory, Norway, 2009. http://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/2009/07/NO0907019I.htm
22 J. Mitchell,The Long Road to Recovery: Community Responses to Industrial
Disaster, United Nations University Press,Tokyo, 1996, 274.
23 Ibid.
24 The ratifiers are: Sweden (1994), Armenia (1996), the Netherlands
(1997), Colombia (1997), Estonia (2000), Brazil (2001), Saudi Arabia
(2001), Albania (2003), Zimbabwe (2003), Belgium (2004), Lebanon
(2005), India 2008, Luxembourg 2008, Bosnia-Herzegovina 2010,
Slovenia 2010 and Ukraine 2011.
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Accidents Convention, the ILO consider that few non-
ratifiers of C161 do have equivalent existing laws.25
In order to improve ratification and increase the general
awareness of occupational hazards, the ILO in 1999 launched
the ‘In Focus Programmes on Safety and Health at Work and
the Environment’ (known as ‘SafeWork’), headed by Takala.
SafeWork are unequivocal in their belief that injuries and
deaths are not an inevitable side-effect of modern work. ‘If all
ILO member states used the best accident prevention
strategies and practices that are already in place and easily
available, some 300,000 deaths (out of the total of 360,000)
. . . could be prevented.’26
6.2 Chemical Safety Policy
The obvious hazard inherent in trading chemicals across
borders has prompted the most extensive of all global regimes
in the industrial safety sphere.Two similar regimes, developed
in the 1980s and implemented in the 1990s around the
principle of ‘Prior Informed Consent’, bear testimony to
Beck’s assertion in support of his Risk Society thesis that ‘In
contrast to material poverty . . .. the pauperization of the
Third World through hazard is contagious for the wealthy’.27
The 1998 Rotterdam Convention28 and 1989 Basle
Convention initiated effective international regulatory systems
compelling the exporters of, respectively, chemicals or
hazardous wastes to notify state authorities in the importing
country if the material is restricted in the country of origin.
These agreements provide some safeguards against the
exploitative dumping of dangerous materials in countries
poorly equipped to deal with them, but also help wealthy
countries feel surer that such dangerous substances will not
revisit them in foodstuffs or pollution in the ‘circle of poison’
effect.
Global regulation with regards to the use and production
of, rather than trade in, hazardous chemicals is predictably less
rigorous but has developed over time.TheWHO had a role in
developing international labelling guidelines for pesticides as
far back as 1953.29 A plethora of international standards in
this area was brought together in 2002 under the Globally
Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of
Chemicals (GHS), co-managed by three IGOs. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is responsible for managing the development of
health and environmental hazard information for developing a
classification scheme. It has set up an expert advisory group
towards this end.The United Nations Committee of Experts
on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods (UNCEDTDG)
has the task of determining criteria for classifying the physical
hazards of chemicals (for example their flammability). The
ILO has assumed responsibility for the overall coordination of
the system, acting as its secretariat, and has also set up a
working group containing governmental and worker
representatives charged with the task of producing a means of
communicating the classification scheme. As well as labelling
standards this will include data sheets for workers involved in
chemical transport and guidance information for governments
on how to implement the scheme. The system began the
process of ratification in 2003 and by 2011 had been
implemented by sixty-seven states. It should be noted,
though, that harmonized global standards are becoming more
popular, not only because they can facilitate trade by levelling
the ‘playing field’ but also because they enhance human
security.
The Seveso disaster was the catalyst for a series of EC
initiatives on industrial safety culminating in the creation of
the EU Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) which
was fleshed out in the ‘Seveso II’ Directive of 1996 (96/82/
EC). MARS is an extensive database of accidents
administered by the Major Accidents Hazards Bureau within
the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre in Ispra,
Italy. MARS has proved so effective that it has fostered
cooperation well beyond the EU’s borders in what could be
considered an instance of ‘spillover-spillover’. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) utilizes the system to facilitate information
exchanges on chemical spills and the UN’s Economic
Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) uses it as the centre
point of a regime based on its Convention on the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents.The UN/ECE
Convention, which came into force in 2000, links the EU
states with other European states, including Russia, and
features a notification system whereby the parties commit
themselves to giving full and prompt information to
neighbouring countries in the event of an accident.
6.3 Nuclear Power Politics
As has been demonstrated, safety standards for the production
of nuclear energy and the transportation of its constituent
elements and by-products tend not to be included in general
international policy on accident prevention. Instead, the
responsibility for this lies with the International Atomic
Energy Authority (IAEA), an Intergovernmental Organization
set up by the UN in 1957 to coordinate policy on both
military and civilian uses of nuclear power.The IAEA has an
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group which has
coordinated the establishment of a range of ‘Safety Principles’
and a ‘Code of Practice on the International Transboundary
Movement of Radioactive Waste’. Prompted by the
Chernobyl disaster and the end of cold war secrecy, the IAEA
codified their most extensive legal instrument to date in the
1990s with the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which came
into force in 1996. The Convention covers a range of issues
including the siting and construction of power plants and
emergency-preparation. However, despite the implied
strengthening of IAEA standards with the use of the term
‘convention’ in place of ‘principles’ and ‘code of practice’, this
is not a robust piece of legislation. In the IAEA’s own words;
‘The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not
designed to ensure fulfilment of obligations by Parties
through control and sanction’.30
25 J. Takala Introductory Report of the International Labour Office, XV World
Congress on Occupational Safety and Health, 12-16 April 1999: 4).
26 J. Takala Introductory Report: Decent Work. Safe Work, XVI World
Congress on Safety and Health atWork,Vienna, 27 May 2002: 6.
27 U. Beck Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity Sage, London, New
Delhi &Thousand Oaks USA,1992, 44.
28 The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Pesticides and Chemicals in InternationalTrade.
29 P. Hough, The Global Politics of Pesticides, Earthscan, London 1998, 55-
57.
30 IAEA, Convention on Nuclear Safety, 2012. http://www-ns.iaea.org/
conventions/nuclear-safety.asp (accessed 13 June 2012).
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The high perception of risk attached to the production of
nuclear power has made this a contentious issue of domestic
politics in many countries but has also promoted a most literal
form of spillover, inducing political cooperation between
states. The Chernobyl disaster, more than Soviet-Western
rapprochement, was the spur for the EC to launch the TACIS
programme (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of
Independent States) in 1991, which gives grants to the
successor states of the Soviet Union and has a strong focus on
the modernization of the nuclear industry.
On the other side of the coin, concerns over the potential
risk from nuclear accidents in other countries have also served
to sour relations between closely integrated countries.
Chernobyl was also a key factor in instigating independence
movements in the Ukraine, where the plant was based, and in
nearby Belarus. In both of these Slavic Soviet Socialist
Republics anti-Russian nationalism was less of a spur for
secession than the feeling of being treated as the USSR’s
industrial wasteland. Hence many of the Ukraine’s large
Russian minority voted for independence and Belarus has
sought to maintain as strong as possible links with Russia
since gaining independence.
Further west, the desire of former USSR satellite states to
integrate themselves into the European Union’s integration
project has brought nuclear safety questions to the fore. The
Austrian Government, backed by public opinion, threatened
to veto the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU unless it
halted the development of its Temelin nuclear power station
located near the Austrian border. The EU, satisfied by an
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) review in 2001
and a 2000 Austro-Czech bilateral agreement on safety (the
Melk Protocol), did not make closing the new plant a
condition of membership but the issue remained contentious
in Austrian civil society and party politics. The EU
collectively, in 2002, called upon Lithuania to close its Soviet
built nuclear plant, Ignalina, as a condition of membership,
and in doing so agreed to provide substantial aid to assist in
the project and compensate for the funding of alternative
sources of energy production.
Even within the established ranks the EU government
policies on nuclear power differ substantially and cause
friction amongst the most integrated states on Earth. The
avowedly non-nuclear Republic of Ireland’s Government has
long complained about the UK’s Sellafield nuclear power
station, located on the Irish Sea coast and in 2001 attempted
to take legal action against the expansion of the plant. The
case was dismissed by the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea but the issue continued to be a source of
diplomatic tension between the two states. Similarly, the
Finnish Government’s declaration of its plans to expand its
reliance on nuclear power in 2002 drew criticism from a
number of its fellow EU Member States, many of whom had
begun to phase out this source of energy production. The
2011 Fukushima leak caused a backlash against nuclear energy
just as its stock was rising, due to its relative attractiveness vis-
à-vis fossil fuels in terms of mitigating climate change. Japan
and Germany were at the forefront of countries reversing
future reliance on nuclear power.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Accidents are the most atypical of global security concerns
and yet represent a much larger threat to most people’s lives
than those most typical of security concerns: war and
terrorism. Most of you reading this are hundreds of times
more likely to die in an accident than be killed by a soldier or
terrorist. Security ‘wideners’ and even some human security
advocates, whilst acknowledging that diseases, crime,
environmental change and natural disasters can sometimes be
matters of security, are reluctant to grant this status to
accidents and man-made disasters. This reluctance seems to
boil down to three objections: i) There is no military or
power politics dimension; ii) They are not deliberate ‘attacks’
on countries or people; iii) They are a domestic and not
international political concern.
Security wideners ignore accidents because there is no real
scope for sending in troops to fight anyone or help clear up in
the aftermath. However, such a line of argument makes sense
only if you are to assume that security is a synonym for
‘involves the military’ rather than a description of what you
are striving to provide for your people in political life. A
further barrier to the ‘securitization’ of disasters for some is
the absence of direct and deliberate human causation. Even
MacFarlane and Foong Khong, whilst purporting to advocate
human security, opine that disasters and accidents ‘fail the
“organized harm” test – tsunami waves, traffic accidents, the
spread of viruses and crop failure are usually not organized by
individuals to do their victims in’.31 For most human security
advocates, though, there is a certain fatalism in assuming that
only direct and deliberate threats to life can be deemed
worthy of security status. Securing people against such
accidents is, again, a political task accepted by industrialized
governments from as far back as the late nineteenth century
when ‘social security’ policies began to evolve in response to
changing economic and social conditions. Accidents, hence,
are actually no more unavoidable than other social systemic
problems, such as war and crime, and people can be secured
against them, at least to some degree. The human agency
argument is flawed on two levels. Firstly, there is human
agency in most accidents. Human failings, whether at the
state, corporate or individual level, account for most accidents
and, hence, can be addressed in political actions. Secondly,
must we deduce from this line of reasoning that anyone
threatened or killed indirectly is not insecure? Are the
‘collateral killings’ of war or insurgency then not military or
terrorist victims? Securing people against accidents has long
been recognized as a task of responsible democratic
government and, whilst that remains, there is compelling logic
that globalization has now shifted some responsibilities to a
wider level.
The notion that worker safety is a purely domestic concern
is difficult to sustain in the face of globalization on either an
ethical or functional argument. If there is a ‘responsibility to
protect’ those imperilled by political violence why should this
not be the case for those imperilled by their government’s or
host government’s political negligence? Indeed it could be
argued that the international community should feel a greater
sense of responsibility when it comes to industrial accidents
since they are more functionally connected to these events in
enjoying the fruits of this hard labour. The contemporary
deaths of Chinese miners or Indian construction workers
recruited to build skyscrapers for global finance firms and
hotels in the Gulf States should trouble western consumers
31 N. MacFarlane & Y. Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN. A
Critical History, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, US, 2006, 275.
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and governments as much as notorious domestic disasters did
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Global standards on the safety aspects of business and
employment are limp when set against comparable standards
for facilitating trade in the produce of this process. The ILO
and the IAEA do not have the same sort of authority in
compelling states to protect workers and citizens living near
areas of industrial production that the World Trade
Organization has in compelling them to allow goods into
their countries. Hence we see one reason why many political
activists have come to view economic globalization as a
dangerous exercise in unfettered liberalism, guided only by
the profit motives of the global North. It is indeed telling
that, whereas the idea of freeing up the movement of
products, services and money is well established as a global
norm, the notion of free movement of the workers producing
such common goods is barely conceivable.As Dauvergne says
of accidents, the ‘global jury of states is assigning no blame, no
ethical responsibility, dismissing these deaths as mere accidents
in the quest for global prosperity’.32
However, ‘unfettered liberalism’ is not the political system
which has emerged from the political evolution of states
which have industrialized and modernized and there is no
reason to believe that it will be for the global polity. The
industrialization of Western European and North American
states prompted the emergence of policies to protect those
put at risk by these social changes, based both on compassion
and pragmatism.An ideological consensus emerged in the late
nineteenth century in support of the notion of state
welfarism.The dangers associated with industrial employment
and the economic uncertainties of trade prompted the
emergence of interventionist liberalism in place of its previous
unfettered free-market version, paternal conservatism and the
birth of socialism. The development of welfare systems in
Western Europe, and to a lesser extent in the USA, arose from
a blend of altruistic human security concerns and internal
state security. Germany, under the arch-conservative
Bismarck, pioneered the idea of state protection for workers
prompted mainly by the pragmatic realism that reform from
above was the best means of preventing revolution from
below. Bismarck’s aim was not so much human security as
state security; maintaining the unity of his newly-formed
country which was witnessing some of the earliest
manifestations of socialist thought.
In addition, there is the business rationale for
internationalizing worker safety.The precedent for freeing up
trade between countries on a regional scale is that the
levelling of an uneven playing field is a necessary precursor to
achieving this. The issue may not arise for countries of a
similar level of economic development, like the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) or the European Economic
Community in its early years but, increasingly, it is recognized
as necessary for cross-border market forces to flourish. The
logic of spillover later dictated, however, that the EC embrace
a social dimension alongside the ‘Single Market’ when it took
on board the relatively poor states of Ireland, Portugal, Spain
and Greece. States with poor safety standards are either: a.
(from an economic perspective) giving themselves an unfair
competitive advantage or b. (from a social perspective) being
exploited. Hence even the North American Free Trade
Association (NAFTA), set up very much on an economic
rationale without the idealism of the European integration
project, featured from the start the ‘North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation’ (NAALC). NAALC,
centred on an industrial dispute resolution mechanism
incorporating occupational safety, came into force alongside
the main NAFTA agreement in 1994 to overcome the
problem of Mexico’s comparative advantage/disadvantage
compared to its wealthier partners to the North.
With the inexorable rise of a coherent global economic
system, global society is now, albeit slowly, awakening to the
need for worker safety standards for both business and moral
reasons. Incidents of workers or residents near industrial plants
in LDCs being killed are no longer unfortunate problems
unconnected with the relatively safe lives of people in the
global North. Developed world consumers are functionally
connected to these systemic failures as never before and
increasingly aware of this fact. Worker safety on an
international scale thus matters both for hard-headed MNCs
concerned for their reputation and soft-hearted consumers.
The rise in the global North of ‘fair trade’ products, in which
the consumer pays a premium for goods imported from
developing countries on the premise that the workers have
not been exploited, and the ‘anti-globalization’ social
movement bear testimony to this fact. What is needed,
though, is not the abandonment of globalization but a more
rounded notion of globalization which balances profits with
responsibilities as is broadly the norm in most developed
democracies.
Such changes are slowly occurring. As with most of the
areas of security, the globalization of democracy and human
rights offers hope for improving personal safety from
accidents since more and more people are able to demand
action from their governments. Studies have shown, for
example, that the unionization of work forces increases
human security in that some countries, such as China,
without independent trade unions, tend to have higher
numbers of accidents.33 In addition, recent evidence points
towards the development of a ‘union effect’ on safety at the
global level. In 1997, work initiated by the WTO towards
establishing ISO (International Organization for
Standardization) standards for health and safety management,
alongside other ‘technical standards’ in order to harmonize
the global trading environment, was abandoned in the face of
intensive global lobbying led by the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The ICFTU
campaigned, principally over the internet, for global standard
setting to be informed more by human safety than by
economic rationale and so be coordinated by the ILO with its
Union affiliations. Evidence is now beginning to emerge of a
globalization of a safety culture. Whilst progress has been
limited on the C174 and C161 conventions, ratifications for
subsequent ILO conventions on occupational safety and
health (OSH) have notably improved since most countries
committed themselves to a ‘national preventative safety and
health culture’ and the notion of a ‘right to a safe and healthy
working environment’ at the Seoul Declaration on Safety and
32 P. Dauvergne, Dying of Consumption: Accidents or Sacrifices of Global
Morality, in Global Environmental Politics 5(3), 35-47, 2005: 44.
33 A. Abrams ‘A Short History of Occupational Health’, Journal of Public
Health Policy, 22(1): 34-80.2001, A. Cheng ‘Fatal Accidents Fall Slightly
on Roads, at Work’, South China Morning Post, 17 April http://
www.china-labour.org.hk/iso/article.adp?article_id=4190&category_
name=Health%20and%20Safety (accessed 5 June 2003).
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Health at Work.34 International guidance has been
disseminated more effectively in a networking of the ‘good
safety is good business’ message. As evidence of progress the
number of global work fatalities has been reduced in recent
years. Having risen from just under to just over 350,000 per
year from the late 1990s to early 2000s, the figure recorded
for 2008 was 320,580.35 Protecting people at work, at home,
travelling or at leisure is for governments and societies,
though, more than charity or even duty. A more secure and
healthy workforce and society is more productive and
contented. Four per cent of global GDP is estimated to be
lost to accidents and around this amount was trimmed off the
Japanese GDP by the single Fukushima disaster.36 As
industrialized European states came to realize from the
nineteenth century, exploiting workers and short-changing
citizens is only profitable for so long when such people can
be shown that there are alternatives. Disillusioned and angry
workers have been a factor in nearly all revolutions. Health
and safety are the dull issues of politics and business but are,
nonetheless, ‘life and death’ both for members of society and
for governments and have been long recognized as such in
industrialized democracies.
Such evidence of progress cannot disguise the fact that the
WTO far outstrips the ILO in global influence, but it
indicates that globalization is not entirely driven by corporate
profit and that a future, more evolved form of the process may
see a world in which human security is enhanced alongside
the spoils of increased trade. Apart from the aftermath of
occasional high-profile disasters, such as those at Bhopal or
Fukushima, the victims of workplace accidents do not trouble
our consciences or enter into the calculations of a
government’s international political priorities.
If the daily global casualty rate at work would be concentrated in
one place, it would be all over the front pages of the world’s
newspapers.
Karl Tapiola, ILO 2005
The growing global discourse of human security can help
in the battle to redress the currently skewed governmental
and intergovernmental priorities. Human security can shine a
light on the dark side of globalization and be the basis for a
better, fairer kind of global governance in which workers, as
well as consumers, are appropriately rewarded and secured.
History shows us that this is a natural development and
ultimately beneficial to all parties. It gives expression to the
plight of those most insecure and neglected of people:
individual vulnerable workers.34 ILO, Introductory Report: Global Trends and Challenges on Occupational
Safety and Health at Work, XIX World Congress on Safety and Health at
Work, Istanbul 11-15 September 2011, 155, 187.
35 ILO 2011 op cit: 11.
36 ILO 2013 op cit: 13 .
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